Ecuador and the risk of a social explosion

 

There is a significant risk of social explosion in Ecuador in the next two years, regardless of who wins the presidency. The combination of an unprecedented security crisis (homicide rate of 39 per 100,000 in 2024), economic inequality, youth unemployment (15–24-year-olds with 11% unemployment according to INEC), and distrust of institutions (Congress with 10% approval rating) creates a breeding ground for discontent. The militarization of security under Noboa and Correa's history of polarization under Gonzalez could exacerbate latent tensions. However, the risk is not imminent unless specific catalysts are present, and its likelihood varies depending on the winner.

Should Daniel Noboa win, the risk is greater in the medium term (2026-2027), if his ‘mano dura’ approach to crime continues to prioritise repression over social solutions. His policy has reduced violence (homicides fell from 47.2 to 39 per 100,000 between 2023 and 2024), but cases such as the murder of four minors in Guayaquil (December 2024) have generated criticism for human rights abuses. If he does not address poverty (27 per cent in 2024) or unemployment and persists with measures such as VAT at 15 per cent, he could face massive protests. His initial stability (Congress and armed forces aligned) could erode if his popularity falls further (currently 40-50%).

If Luisa González wins, the risk is more immediate (2025-2026) due to the polarization generated by Correism. Her agenda of social spending and rejection of militarization could calm popular sectors but would clash with a hostile Congress and economic elites, generating ungovernability. If he tries to reverse Noboa's policies (such as the delegation of the Sacha farm) or increase taxes on the rich, he could trigger conflicts with the right and business, while his ties with Rafael Correa alienate CONAIE and other groups. The lack of control over the armed forces could also aggravate insecurity.

Noboa is more at risk in the long term due to attrition and social protests; González, in the short term due to ungovernability and polarization. Noboa seems less prone to an immediate outburst thanks to his institutional control.

Who would lead protests

CONAIE and Pachakutik: The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, with its history of paralyzing the country (2019, 2022), would lead protests against Noboa for military abuses or against González for extractivist policies (such as Yasuní). They represent indigenous and rural communities.

Unions and informal workers: CGTP and 70% of the informal workforce (INEC) could mobilise against unpopular economic measures (VAT hike under Noboa, cuts or instability under Gonzalez).

Urban youth: Students and unemployed youth, active in networks and streets (as in 2019), would be a key driver, especially in Quito and Guayaquil, against insecurity or repression.

Political opposition: Under Noboa, correismo (RC) could whip up protests if she loses; under González, ADN and PSC could do so if she governs. Both would use discontent to destabilise.

What would be the impact of social unrest in Ecuador?

Productive paralysis: Road blockades (as in 2019, with losses of USD 1.5 billion in 12 days) would affect trade, agriculture (bananas, flowers) and oil (Sacha and other fields).

Capital flight: The country’s risk, currently at 1,511 points, could exceed 2,000, making external financing more expensive and slowing foreign investment.

Fall in tourism: Instability would drive away visitors, hitting a sector that contributes 5% of GDP.

Inflation and unemployment: Disruption of supply chains would raise prices (food, fuel), while business closures would increase unemployment (already at 5% formal).

Fiscal deficit: The government would spend more on security or emergency subsidies, aggravating the deficit (4% of GDP in 2024).