What will happen on July 28th in Venezuela?



The key variables for the Venezuelan elections on July 28th are:

  • The level of participation, since a turnout of more than 70% would be an indicator of a victory for the opposition.
  • The permanence or not of the current opposition card or candidate, since although there is the possibility of a last-minute change, even if illegal, if it happens then it will affect the turnout and the effective vote, affecting the performance of the opposition.
  • The opposition's ability to mobilize voters, especially in times when Chavismo applies Slowdown Operation.
  • The performance of the electoral process and its irregularities, since in theory the machines have batteries for 10 hours in case of blackout (Maduro's threat).
  • During the voting, and especially after it is over and the results are announced, the key is the ability to mobilize against fraud or an unfavorable result for any of the candidates, especially in the case of the opposition, given that Chavismo will mobilize later if it mobilizes. That night, it would be a shock if the regime accepted its defeat. But if the regime does not win and commits fraud, the mobilization of the opposition will be key.
  • The capacity for repression may be great in the central region and the capital, but not so much in the provinces. It relies less on the GNB than on the PNB. Both lack troops in case the protest is massive.
  • The reaction of the military high command.
  • The reaction of the military units to the decision of the military high command.

 Given these variables, this is what would happen:

  1. If there is a high participation and acceptance of the results by the Maduro regime, we would be facing the possible beginning of a transition process. The transition will be accidental, because although the alternation and change of government helps the mood, the internal situation of the country is very complex in all senses and requires a lot of consensus, including the Chavistas and especially the Chavista military for its recovery. It is unlikely that the most active and organized Chavistas, who are resentful, will cooperate.
  2. If the turnout is low, Maduro's victory is a fact.
  3. If there is a high turnout and fraud, there will be protests that would mean another bloodbath, but that Maduro would be able to control through exhaustion with nightly repression and targeted terror, as he has done on other occasions, unless the military high command turns its back on him for not controlling the garrisons, which would end up joining generalized demonstrations not comparable to those of the last decade, but of a much broader and more intense nature.
  4. In the case of a fraudulent victory by Maduro, we rule out the scenario of a civil war, even though it seems to be happening at the beginning. For three reasons: 1) a civil war is carried out only by two armed sides, 2) the military acts as an estate, 3) Maduro has a powerful reserve, which is the alliance with the forces of evil, i.e. the ELN, Islamic groups, Russians and various criminal groups.
  5. In the case of a victory of the opposition and the recognition of the military high command, we also exclude a civil war, for the first two reasons of the previous assumption, but also because it is very feasible that the armed forces, as an estate, decide to fight against those who take away the business and the domination in the national territory, that is, the forces of evil mentioned before. Especially against the ELN. The bill that the military high command will pay for betraying Maduro will be high, and without a doubt they would gain more by betraying Maduro (they would be heroes and guarantors of order and the economy) than by supporting Maduro, who, following his Stalinist style, would begin a purge once his regime is consolidated in 2025.

In conclusion, we suspect that if the Military High Command is correct and there is a high turnout, Maduro will not be able to emerge victorious from his fraud, because he would be betrayed by his Military High Command, which listens to the voices of the garrisons, the international community (anxious to close the case) and his need to resume his real grip on power, unhindered by the Maduro clique and the sanctions. This is our perception one week before the 28th of July.

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